Support for International Development in Former Communist Countries of the European Union –

Reconstructing Political Culture

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(draft literature review, please do not quote)

Successful democratic transition and consolidation require, inter alia, the internalization of certain social and political (and perhaps economic) values by the citizenry, usually subsumed under the umbrella of *civic culture*. In this research, I adopt a rather unconventional view of political culture, one that transcends the boundaries of the nation state, and includes "objects of support" specific to the international arena – such as international aid and cooperation for development, European Union integration policies and foreign policy. I set to explore the ways in which political attitudes concerning democracy carry over to the ways in which people perceive and evaluate transnational issues, in both traditional and more recent EU member states. Through comparative analyses of European survey data, I examine how attitudes towards democracy at the national level tie into attitudes towards international political objects in EU member states, and conclude that modernization processes explain the evolution of pro-democratic attitudes at both national level and vis-à-vis international issues.

In this investigation, I bridge the gap between international relations and comparative politics, by constructing a theoretical framework that, while grounded in political culture, is applied to issues of foreign policy, which is appropriated primarily by international relations research. In fact, the type of analysis that I propose might be best placed within the sociology of international relations, a field that is underrepresented in the traditional study of international relations. For instance, Hobson (1998) brings historical sociological approaches into the study of international relations, but bridging political culture and public opinion and foreign policy is much less common (Goldsmith et al. 2005).

I assume political attitudes and evaluations, traditionally considered to form the core of political culture "proper" are part and parcel of broader principles that citizens form in societies (mostly through socialization). Therefore, these fundamental political principles that citizens have are translated into more specific views of different political objects, from the political system, its ruling ideology, to the international world and peacekeeping. I do not intend on tracing the process of attitude formation from broader beliefs but rather testing whether attitudes referring to domestic political objects match attitudes towards the international sphere. More specifically, I apply Inglehart's modernization perspective to old and new countries of the EU and explore how the survival/self-expression divide carries over to how citizens perceive the "international".

This displacement of the concept from the national to the supranational level is warranted by at least four reasons. First, in the context of an enlarged European Union and its permanent efforts to render its policies less plagued by the democratic deficit, popular attitudes and evaluations become critical in assessing the union's legitimacy. Second, if political culture is a way of measuring the level of democracy in a country,

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then foreign policies should be subject to popular scrutiny just as much as domestic policies are. Third, globalization and regionalization rendered the border line between the national and the transnational rather blurry, and national governments have face transnational problems to which they need to offer transnational answers (migration, human trafficking, international development, etc.). Fourth, and perhaps, most importantly, the new member states of the European Union are in a position of both consolidating their democracy, while, at the same time, Therefore, citizens have been playing increasingly important roles in evaluating international/transnational policies, and the discipline of international relations quickly acknowledged it.

In the following, I first critically review the literature on political culture, and its possible „displacement" towards the sphere of international relations. Second, I introduce „modernization" as a potential model that can explain the formation of attitudes and values towards political objects, both national and international. Third, I bring empirical evidence in support of the model. Finally, I discuss the implications, limitations and directions of future research.

Political culture and foreign policy

The study of political attitudes is closely related to the study of political participation. In a consolidated democracy, both the citizenry's attitudes and its participatory acts in the affairs of the polity are the true test of the latter's viability. While attitudes usually measure people's internalization of democratic values, participation is indicative of their willingness and ability to participate in the structures of representative democracy. Attitudes towards democracy illustrate citizens' satisfaction with the working of their political system, both in generic and more specific terms. Especially in the case of new democracies, favorable attitudes towards the political system are critical because of the unconsolidated status of democracy (Mishler & Rose, 1997).

Political attitudes form the nucleus of political culture. Almond and Verba first formulated their *Civic Culture* thesis in 1963. They defined political culture as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among the members of a nation." (Almond & Verba, 1963, pp. 14-15) The authors conceive attitudes as a multi faceted notion, distinguishing between objects and modes of orientations. The modes of orientations are the ways in which the individual can relate to an object, and include three different elements: cognition, affects and evaluations. The political objects differ according to their location within the political system, and consist of input objects, output objects and the self as a political actor. The combination of modes and orientations result in a matrix, whose cells represent different types of political culture: parochial, subject and participant. In their reformulation of the theory in 1980, Almond and Verba operated the following fundamental change: modes of orientation are now interrelated aspects of the one and the same attitudinal phenomenon.

The first categorization of attitudes is operated with regards to the political structure under evaluation. The most analyzed structure is the political system, which consists of a complex set of entities:

> the distribution of attitudes towards the national community, the regime and the authorities [which include] the sense of national identity, attitudes toward the legitimacy of the regime and its various institutions, and attitudes toward the legitimacy and effectiveness of the incumbents of the various political roles. (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 28)

The process culture includes "attitudes toward the self in politics (including the parochial-subject-participant distinction) and attitudes toward other political actors (such as trust, cooperative competence, hostility)." (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 28) Finally, the policy culture groups together "the distribution of preferences regarding the outputs and outcomes of politics, the ordering among different groupings in the population of such political values as welfare, security and liberty." (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 28) Although this categorization seems fairly strict, the system, process and policy cultures are not separate entities, but rather overlapping structures.

David Easton also provides a helpful theoretical framework for analyzing attitudes, according to their object of support. In his system analysis (1965), there are three components of a political system that can become objects of support: the political community, the regime, and the political authorities. The political community is "that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor." (Easton, 1965, p. 177) The regime consists of three elements: the values of its political philosophy, the norms of the political order, and the structure of authority rules. The political authorities are the occupants of authority roles, at particular moments in time. These three categories range from inclusive to specific, but support for one category does not automatically imply support for the others. Easton introduced the concepts of diffuse and specific support, and theorizes that the objects themselves affect the formation of the correlative attitudes.

This short review indicates that the concept of political culture indicates was specifically invented to be applied at the domestic level, the national political system. Given that the first edition of the *Civic Culture* got published in the early 1960s, and that most of the evolution of the concept of political culture (and some of its related spin-offs – social capital for example) is intimately tied to the Third Wave of Democratization(s), it is not surprising that political participation and attitudes were first and foremost analyzed in relationship with the utmost political object – the nation state. Nevertheless, it is also possible to conceptualize this system as the international system, with its own set of rules, processes and policies, especially in the context of increasing role of citizens' input in the formulation of foreign policy.

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Political culture and the international system

Rosenau makes a valid point emphasizing the role of individuals in the field of international relations: "the micro level of individuals has to be integrated into the analysis [of the emerging global order] because structures at the macro level seem increasingly vulnerable to shifts in the skills and orientations of the publics they encompass" (Rosenau in Sinnott, 1995, 27). Furthermore, he notes people's increased awareness and analytical skills, as well as the highly interdependent character of the world. Sinnott (1995) develops the last argument, and asserts that this enhanced awareness and increasing interference of individuals in the international sphere might actually result in a public demand for international regimes. Robert Putnam also includes public opinion in presenting "a more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations"(Putnam in Sinnott, 1995, 29). Therefore, public opinion becomes increasingly relevant in the international arena.

The discipline of international relations was nevertheless slow in allowing individuals in. In 1978 Peter Gourevitch observed the fact that comparativists and international relations scholars may look at the same issues, but not ask the same questions. While the former are interested in explanations of foreign policy based on decisions made at the domestic level, the latter look at how the international system influences national policy making. The two types of investigators do not meet because thier methodology, language and priorities of research are different. For the former, the domestic level is highly structured, hierarchical, mostly apolitical (Gourevitch 1978). For the latter, the constraints and exigencies of a permanently changing international system illustrate the sources of change in domestic policies; they include complex interdependence, globalization, transnationalism, or regionalism.

A significant advancement in the convergence of the two approaches took place in the 1990s, when Moravcsik (1997) reformulated liberal international relations theory by considering the primacy of societal actors in international relations – thus understanding both domestic and foreign policy as the creation of private individuals and groups. According to him, the state is not an actor per se, but rather a representative institution in constant need for securing political support and acquiring legitimacy of its policies – argument applicable at both domestic and foreign policy levels. Moreover, in democracies, the state needs to be a legitimate representative of some societal interests as the very essence of democratic politics.

In addition to neo-liberal theorizing that emphasizes the complex relationship between domestic and foreign policy making, usually grounded in a rational choice paradigm, social constructivism has brought in the discussion the issue of reflectivity. In other words, both national and international politics mutually constitute each other, and both foreign and national interests and identities are constantly re-fashioned through social interaction (Checkel 1997, Wendt 1999, Christiansen et al. 2001, Klotz and Lynch 2007). In this context, being able to trace changes in public opinion regarding both

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foreign and national policy making is a way of testing this dynamic relationship between national and international policy objectives and decisions.

Public policy includes both national and foreign policy, and I employ the policy design approach to public policy (Larason Schneider and Ingram 1997) – that emphasizes the social construction of relevant stakeholders and the impact of policy on the target population.

The importance that public opinion is portrayed to have the context of foreign policy ranges from minimal – an ill-informed, passive, manipulable audience, to more rational, analytical people, understanding the priorities and interests of each state's international role. One of the traditional views was formulated by Almond (1961, and not coincidentally the same author with the creator of civic culture), according to which the American public would accept almost any foreign policy as long as it fit within some vague limits (non-interventionism for a while, for example; Cold War mentality for another while, etc.) and that foreign policy is the one policy with the least restricting relationship with public opinion. Consequently, the Almond-Lippmann Consensus was coined as the quintessential view on the irrelevance of American public opinion on foreign policy matters. Later, Page and Shapiro (1984) showed that in fact public opinion is rational and consistent, while Mueller (1973) argued that the American public is able and willing to express informed opinions even in matters of defense and military policies. More recent research (Powlick and Katz, 1998) suggest that the relationship between public opinion and foreign polic is intermediated by the mass-media, like it is the case with any policy. The book edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane *Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change* (1993) reflects the preoccupation to understand how ideas influence policy, and, more specifically, what types of ideas, under what circumstances and in what contexts determine what kinds of policy outcomes, especially applied to the sphere of foreign policy. The role of ideas is discussed in response to rationalism in international relations (rational choice theory diminishes the role of ideas to elite games) and also to „reflectivism" (in fact constructivism). While the constructivist claim that identities and interests are endogenous to interaction is accepted as a valuable starting point for the main thesis of the book, it criticizes the antiempirical bias extant in much reflectivist work, arguing that „the key issue, however, is not whether identities matter but how they matter, and how their effects can be systematically studied by social scientists" (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, 6). Although the impact of public opinion on foreign policy seems to be conditioned by many aspects (institutional, cultural, etc.****), the core values that a citizen holds are difficult to unpack, and they do not necesarily refer only to eh state level, but rather reflect views of the world, of the international system, and of the roles that one's country/EU has to assume on the international stage (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Diven and Constantelos (2009) explored the previous idea further and found that the

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ways in which people portray international aid is filtered through their beliefs systems, and engage their views on the role of government, on individualism, their trust of the state institutions, their education and information.

The conceptualization of ideas in this research is very similar to the one adopted by Goldstein and Keohane, and refers to „particular beliefs – shared by large numbers of people – about the nature of their worlds that have implications for human action. Such beliefs range from from general moral principles to agreement on a specific application of scientific knowledge" (7).

Integrating values – modernization, postmodernization and other demons

In this paper I understand modernization as a complex process which has an impact on the ways citizens perceive their political system, their political communities, and on their political beliefs in general. Therefore, I will briefly review the theory of modernization, as it is presented within democratization focusing on Central and Eastern Europe. Then, I focus on Inglehart's view on modernization as the theory that links developmental changes to the formation of attitudes and consider it as he grounds on which my model develops. Finally, I also discuss the modernizing effects of transnational and international phenomena, such as migration, globalization and socialization through international organizations.

Modernization theses start the discussion at the country level, and trickle down to individual level. As economic development takes place, levels of education increase, and the social stratification of the society changes, making space for the middle-class – the main promoter of democracy:

> First, economic development is closely associated with increases in education, which in turn promotes political attitudes conducive to democracy (e.g. interpersonal trust and tolerance of opposition). Second, economic development alters the pyramid-shaped social stratification system, in which the majority of the population is lower class and poor, to a diamond shape, in which the majority of the population is middle class and relatively well-off. (Muller, 1995a, p. 967)

According to Lipset (1959), the middle class, the main driver of democratization, has to become more educated because of their occupational status, and, through this process, they develop pro-democratic attitudes. These attitudes spread into the larger society because of the increasing size of the middle class "the middle class emerges as the main pro-democratic force in Lipset's analysis, and this class gains in size with socio economic development." (Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, 1992, p. 14) Alternatively, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) see the advent of democracy as a direct function of the growing urban working class. In their view, it is neither political culture, nor education that affects the diffusion of democracy, but the

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fact that the working class accumulates more power, and, it is only logical for the working class to engage in democratic opening dialogue (Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, 1992).

While widely respected in the academia, the modernization theory fails to take into consideration cases of countries that exhibit high poverty rates, and also democratic forms of government. Clague, Gleason and Knack (2001) retest the modernization theory, on a larger set of countries, and add another critical explanatory variable: sequential and institutional development. They criticize Lipset's thesis on several counts. First, literacy and life expectancy are not adequate indicators for economic development, since they can be both causal factors and consequences of democracy, and hence it is almost impossible to assert causal direction. Moreover, literacy, primary education and health services could reflect cultural attitudes towards social equality that, in turn, may be supportive of democracy. It is apparent that the relationship between economic development and support for democracy is neither definitive nor necessarily direct. Sequential and institutional development is seen as indicative of a high level of institutionalization of societal interactions and potential conflicts: the mere number of groups competing for power is not as critical as are the power relations between groups (Clague et al., 2001). They also mention colonial power, the size of the population and religion, as important predictors of pro-democratic attitudes.

The applicability of the modernization thesis in Central and Eastern Europe is partial. In general, the formation of attitudes towards a political or economic system can be explained by invoking two broad arguments. The first argument focuses on self-interested rational actors, and most of the literature on the attitudes towards market economy in Central and Eastern Europe has been grounded in this approach. In other words, individuals that see themselves as potential winners of the transition process will have more support for the new system than potential losers (McIntosh, MacIver, Abele & Smeltz, 1994). The alternative, or even complementary approach focuses on political socialization, and emphasizes symbolic politics:

> this model suggests that policy preferences toward the market and democracy are triggered by generally enduring attitudes about such "symbolic" issues as the relationship between the individual and the state, the importance of freedom versus equality and the value of new versus traditional ways. (p. 484)

The applicability of this approach to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe is limited, because of the lack of time for political socialization within democracy to take place. Furthermore, the "symbolic" relationship between citizens and the state does not have to be exclusively constructed around the tenets of democratic

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government. The same relationship can also be created along the lines of national identity and support for the nation state.

Most scholars of Central and Eastern European democratization however, find support for the modernization theory (Fleron, Jr., & Ahl, 1998, 1994, Kullberg & Zimmerman, 1999). Overall, socio economic status and demographic indicators such as gender and place of residence work through a process of empowerment, that results in people with higher status playing more important roles in the polity; at the very minimum, empowerment provides them with skills and abilities improving their subjective feelings of political efficacy.

The applicability of the modernization hypotheses is also limited in Central and Eastern Europe through the presence of deeply rooted communist values. For instance, Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) found that in the former USSR, highly educated people were more inclined to support political change, but also less inclined to support individual responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry. The inconsistency of this finding is evaluated against western criteria, according to which, more educated people usually do not lean on the state for support. In support of the latter assertion, Miller et al. (1993) found that in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania, education was positively related to individual responsibility and to support for political reform, and also found that political reform was positively and strongly related to support for individual responsibility. Moreover, Miller et al. (1996) rejected the more contextualized approach of Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) and claimed universal value for their findings. In 1996, Finifter replicated her own study, with more methodological specifications, on a new dataset, and found support for her initial thesis, thus concluding that there is no universal finding that correlates positively support for political reform and support for individualism, nor between education and individualism.

In East Central Europe, the role that institutions play in the formation of political attitudes is even more important because of their short existence. According to Munck and Leff (1997) initial institutional choices, affected by the identity and strategy of the agent of change, determine the extent of democratic support. In other words, people might learn democracy, but they will only be as democratic as the incumbent transitional regimes allowed them to be (Munck & Leff, 1997).

Peflley and Rohrschneider (2003) make an interesting argument claiming that the fact that Central and Eastern Europe is democratizing does not mean that tolerance of other liberal values is also widespread. They note that the literature on democratization and political tolerance rarely intersect. According to the authors, there is overwhelming evidence that democracy is at its widest coverage ever and enjoys incredibly widespread support (Norris, 1999, Klingemann, 1998). They document the spread of support for democracy across the globe (Mishler & Rose, 2002), and identify two causes for this unexpected avalanche of countries manifesting high levels of support for democratic polities, even outside of the Western hemisphere. The first cause is the diffusion of democratic norms through mass media, personal contacts, and rising levels

of education (Weil, 1989, 1993, Inglehart, 1997). This argument is a quintessential version of both of modernization and democratic contagion theses. The second cause is the changing value structure of citizens, in the sense of more personal autonomy and post-material values, that occurs in non –western contexts too (Inglehart, 1997).

Ronald Inglehart first formulated his "materialism/postmaterialism" argument in the late 1980s in "Culture shift in advanced industrial societies". Based on time series cross country survey data he showed that as people have better material conditions, they start to be more interested in asserting and developing postmaterial components of their identities, such as their preoccupations with the environment or gender and sexual identity. Inglehart reformulated his argument many times, one of the last being in 2005 in *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. The authors distinguish two perpendicular dimensions, one bordered by traditional versus secular-rational values and one by survival versus self-expression values. Every country can be located on the so-called cultural map (p. 57). According to Pappi (2007)

"Theoretically, Modernization I is interpreted as a consequence of industrialization that nurtured secular-rational values as opposed to traditional values (the importance of God, teaching children obedience and faith rather than independence and determination, disapproval of abortion, support of national pride, respect for authority). Modernization II is interpreted as a consequence of postindustrialization (work force in services, e.g.) triggering self-expression values at the expense of survival values (priority for economic and physical security p materialist values, feeling of unhappiness, disapproval of homosexuality, abstaining from signing petitions, distrust of other people)"

The countries that score the highest on both dimensions are Scandinavian and Japan, closely followed by North-Western Europe. The United States has a high score on self-expression values, but its citizens remain quite tradition in terms of religiosity. Former communist countries have "benefitted" from Modernization I, thus having acquired the secular-rational values, while remaining close to survival values on the other dimension.

Inglehart's two-sequences modernization thesis forms a rather parsimonious model while also being quite compelling. <mark>Critique</mark>

The case of East Central European countries is prone to fit the modernization in sequences, but not only because of the "normal" course of democratization processes, but also for a variety of reasons that are specific to the area. First, all these countries have undertaken all necessary steps to becoming members of the European Union. Authors argue that this process of socialization within the EU (as an integrating structure but essentially an intergovernmental organization) has distinct effects on the countries institutional and societal development. Moreover,

the differences between national and international policy-making become increasing blurred, with some prerogatives of the nation states being transferred to the European level, and some priorities and policies at the European level being applied to the national level. Romania's European integration is one such case of socialization through international organizations (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006, Grabbe 2006) and new ideas in Keohane and Goldstein's vocabulary become common parlance fairly fast.

<mark>Migration effects</mark>
<mark>Contagion effects</mark>

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Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence by Ronald

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