

The Political Cultures of International Development: An Exploratory Study of Public Opinion in Central and Eastern Europe

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Road map

- This is exploratory public opinion research
- I aim to find out whether the ways in which people think about domestic and international issues are related (why would they not be?)
- I focus on the post-communist states of the EU (in comparison to some “older” EU members)
- I find that the core values that ground political attitudes at the domestic level (political culture *a la carte*) also influence perceptions of the international arena
- Democratization affects views of both national and international politics

Relevance

- Academically “unconventional” – because it dislocates political culture from its “natural habitat” (the nation state) and it moves it to the supranational level
- It also bring uncomfortably close comparative politics and international relations – two disciplines with their own experts, prestige and separate claims to understanding the world
- It has relevance in the context of policy making and the role of the citizen in decision making (domestically, regionally, internationally)


IR vs. CP?- the public opinion link

- As early as 1978, Peter Gourevitch observed the fact that comparativists and international relations scholars may look at the same issues, but not ask the same questions.
- Differences in methodology, language and priorities of research.
- Citizens and foreign policy - The Almond-Lippmann consensus – erratic and irrelevant public opinion vis-à-vis foreign policy
- Afterwards: Rational and consistent views on foreign policy (Page and Shapiro, 1984); the role of mass-media (Powlick and Katz, 1998); domestic structure and coalition building processes mediate and condition the effect of public opinion on foreign policy, in liberal democracies (US, UK, Germany and Japan) (Risse-Kappen, 1991)

Political culture

- Cognitions, values, emotional commitments about the political system (sometimes it includes participatory acts too)
- Almond and Verba - The Civic Culture – what is the “good” political culture? (parochial, subject, participatory)
- Very important in democracies – at least as important in democratizing countries (why?)
- East Central Europe are more traditional, less postmaterialistic (Inglehart) – I ask: are these values reflected in the way postcommunist citizens perceive the international system too? (especially international development)

The cultural map Inglehart and Welzel



International development

- Hot topic
- More subject to public scrutiny than foreign policy proper
- hybrid
- New EU member states are both donors and recipients of development funds
- Public support for international aid matters (sometimes) (Otter, 2003)
- New EU member states display high support for international development, **but why?**
- Experiment: apply political culture approaches to the study of public opinion towards development

Special Eurobarometer 73.5 - 2010 – on development

- Overall – all members of the EU (new and old) tend to have consistently high support for international development – commitment, at least at the level of principle is uniformly distributed
- Difference in awareness (a difference of 10% in the comparison between East and West)
- Difference in volunteering and money giving (37.8% in the West vs. 11.2% in post communist countries)
- Different perceptions of Africa (post colonial West looks at poverty alleviation, and emphasizes democracy and human rights; post communist East looks at corruption, peace and security)

Who wants what? Why?

- There is a lot of variety within the EU (the Scandinavian countries are consistently high supporters of development)
- Poland (2010): significant support for development (growing, despite recession); increased awareness of MDGs; two reasons widely accepted: “moral duty” and “clear conscience”
- Romania (2009) - mixed results: most people think rich countries have to help poor countries (less so the women, and the very educated); reasons: moral duty, Romania is a poor country, reciprocity

European values (Eurobarometer 67.1 - 2007)- political culture

	Postcommunist countries (% out of all postcommunist respondents)	“Western” EU countries (% out of all Western respondents)	Highest postcommunist value (% out of respondents in that respective country)	Lowest postcommunist value (% out of respondents in that respective country)
Environment	55.1	53.1	Slovakia 63	Bulgaria 45.3
Solidarity	34.4	38.8	Slovakia 43	Romania 27.4
Entrepreneurship	11.0	7.4	Bulgaria 14.8	Lithuania 8.9
Cultural diversity	14.6	10.1	Latvia 23.8	Poland 8.2
Peace	60.2	59.7	Hungary 68.1	Lithuania 46.4
Progress	13.1	12.0	Hungary 25.3	Estonia 7.8
Freedom of opinion	26.4	34.7	Czech Republic 34.6	Hungary 14.5
Tolerance	32.5	35.3	Slovenia 50.0	Latvia 20.5
Respect of history	22.0	13.3	Estonia 28.5	Bulgaria, Romania 15.3

Central tendency indicators for postmaterialism, democracy and religious measures (per country)

Country - year		Post-Materialist index 12-item min=1 max =5 (5=postmaterialist)	How often do you attend religious services min=1, max=8 (8=non goer)	Religious person min=1, max=3 (3=non religious)	Democracy index min=6 max=60 (high values, more democratic)
Bulgaria (2006)	Mean	1.43	5.24	1.42	47.4
	N	893	986	897	789
	Std. Deviation	1.081	2.021	.592	13.04
Georgia (2009)	Mean	1.44	4.29	1.04	54.11
	N	1413	1500	1477	1273
	Std. Deviation	1.050	1.969	.202	7.34
Germany (2006)	Mean	2.62	6.00	1.75	51.27
	N	1935	2015	1950	1273
	Std. Deviation	1.117	2.197	.745	8.28
Moldova (2006)	Mean	1.75	4.74	1.17	48.37
	N	1020	1043	1016	948
	Std. Deviation	1.125	1.969	.401	8.63
Poland (2005)	Mean	2.01	2.94	1.07	50.64
	N	924	993	970	866
	Std. Deviation	.987	1.733	.316	9.70
Romania (2005)	Mean	1.60	3.93	1.07	55.49
	N	1527	1765	1739	1434
	Std. Deviation	1.053	1.936	.279	5.67
Slovenia (2005)	Mean	2.39	5.06	1.37	48.30
	N	933	1010	915	868
	Std. Deviation	1.046	2.349	.656	9.71
Sweden (2006)	Mean	2.75	6.71	1.84	48.76
	N	974	1002	981	963
	Std. Deviation	1.160	1.721	.693	5.67
United States (2006)	Mean	1.99	4.56	1.28	46.24
	N	1210	1198	1202	1182
	Std. Deviation	1.255	2.727	.512	10.27
Total	Mean	2.17	5.10	1.40	49.4
	N	16699	17598	17119	15117
	Std. Deviation	1.229	2.389	.616	9.26

The democracy index was constructed by adding 6 questions from a battery of similarly measured items tapping understandings of democracy as: free elections, civil rights, freedom from oppression, economic prosperity, rule of law, gender equality.

The postmaterialism index was constructed by Inglehart. The postmaterialists items are ‘more say about jobs and communities’, ‘make our cities and countryside more beautiful’ ‘more say in political decisions’, ‘protecting freedom of speech’, ‘progress toward less impersonal and more humane society’ and ‘progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money’. The materialist items are ‘economic growth’, ‘strong defence forces’, ‘order in the nation’, ‘fighting rising prices’, ‘stable economy’, and ‘fight against crime’. After examining the structure of these items with principal components analysis, Inglehart (1997, 111) drops the ‘more beautiful’ option from the postmaterial scale, as it does not load strongly on a postmaterialist factor.

Support for development (Eurobarometer 67.1 - 2007)(reasons and goals)

Reasons	Postcommunist countries (% out of all postcommunist respondents)	“Western” EU countries (% out of all Western respondents)	Goals	Postcommunist countries (% out of all postcommunist respondents)	“Western” Eu countries (% out of all Western respondents)
Self interest	26.8	29.3	Reduce poverty	68.7	65.3
Prevent terrorism	16.9	17.7	Access to primary education	32.6	34.2
Global stability	24.8	29.5	Gender equality	10.6	17.0
Encouraging democracy	17.6	22.4	Reduce child mortality	33.3	27.2
Clear conscience	11.1	11.9	Reduce maternal deaths	9.3	8.9
Political allies	17.0	13.8	Combat diseases	49.6	45.9
Avoid emigration	24.1	17.0	Sustainable development	23.4	33.6
Help poor people	10.5	12.6	Gobal partnership for development	16.2	18.4

Logistic regression models on 5 dependent variables measuring attitudes towards the role of the nation state in international issues (regime type is a country level variable and has 3 values: old democracy (US, Sweden, Germany), new democracy (Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia) , and non-democracy (Georgia, Moldova))

	International peace	Environmental protection	International aid	Refugees	Human rights
Postmaterialism	-.123 (.021)	-.105 (.019)	-.024 (.023)	-.088 (.020)	-.100 (.020)
Religiosity	-.177 (.051)	-.087 (.044)	-.193 (.056)	-.124 (.047)	-.219 (.048)
Church attendance	-.015 (.012)	-.026 (.011)	.045 (.013)	-.014 (.011)	-.027 (.011)
gender	.026 (.046)	-.088 (.043)	.032 (.052)	.033 (.044)	-.026 (.045)
age	.002 (.001)	.005 (.001)	.005 (.002)	.001 (.001)	.002 (.001)
education	.005 (.012)	.011 (.011)	-.013 (.013)	.036 (.011)	.002 (.011)
democracy	.000 (.015)	.012 (.002)	-.008 (.003)	.008 (.002)	.002 (.002)
regyme type	-.732 (.034)	-.402 (.031)	.197 (.038)	-.398 (.032)	-.783 (.033)
<i>Cox&Snell Rsq</i>	.094	.047	.010	.040	.113
<i>Nagelkerke Rsq</i>	.129	.062	.016	.055	.151

b-coefficients and std. errors, bold for significant at .05, bold and * for significant at .01

Conclusions and more

- Core political values seem to influence attitudes towards all things international
- Elite interviewing (political, academic, NGO, diaspora) on how consolidating democracy plays out in the sphere of societal views of foreign policy
- These findings raise questions about how “integrated” value systems are/could/should be
- Interdisciplinary approaches needed!
- THANK YOU!